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A. Introduction
Many observers have characterized the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 ("CAFA") as decidedly pro-defendant.1 Yet, supporters
of the legislation assert that at least one section-the Consumer Class
Action Bill of Rights2  will serve primarily to protect the interests of
class action plaintiffs.3 According to these groups, the Consumer
Bill of Rights will make class action settlements fairer for class
members and will help to ensure that class members, not just their
attorneys, receive benefits from settlement agreements.
4
Support for the Consumer Bill of Rights is not, however,
universal. Some critics believe that the legislation does not do
enough to improve settlements for plaintiffs.5  Many of its
provisions, they contend, do little more than reiterate existing
practices. 6 Other groups argue that CAFA goes too far in regulating
coupon settlements, creating unnecessary burdens for defendants,
and effectively eliminating coupons altogether, rather than just
preventing abusive settlements.
7
1. E.g., Stephanie Fiereck, Class Action Reform. Be Prepared to Address
New Notification Requirements, 6 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 333, 333 (2005)
(noting that CAFA was "promoted as a business-backed initiative"); Scott
Nelson & Brian Wolfman, A Section-by-Section Analysis of the Class Action
"Fairness" Act, 6 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 365, 372 (2005) ("The Class
Action Fairness Act marks the first major success of the Bush administration's
efforts to enact pro-defendant civil justice legislation.").
2. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3, 119 Stat. 4,
5-9 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (2006)). For brevity, the Consumer
Class Action Bill of Rights is hereafter referred to as the Consumer Bill of
Rights.
3. John Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, The Class Action Fairness
Act: Cleaning Up the Class Action Mess, 6 CLASS ACTION L1T1G. REP. 104,
104 (2005).
4. See id.
5. See Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 365.
6. Id.
7. Ralph Lindeman, Class Action Lawyers Doubt Provisions in
Legislation Aimed at Curbing Abuses, 5 CLASS ACTION LIT1G. REP. 265, 265
(2005) [hereinafter Lindeman, Class Action Lawyers Doubt Provisions]; Ralph
Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds for Years of Litigation to Interpret Changes
Imposed by Reform Law, 6 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 177, 178 (2005)
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Several provisions in the Consumer Bill of Rights regulate
settlements in which the defendant gives the class coupons in lieu of,
or in addition to, a cash award.8 Lawmakers passed these regulations
in response to critics' complaints that such settlements often
overcompensate plaintiffs' attorneys, while doing little to benefit the
class. 9 One reason for this perceived problem is that many courts
calculate attorneys' fees using the value of all the coupons a
defendant offers, even if the class is unlikely to use them.10 To
address this concern, CAFA requires courts to base such fees on the
value of the coupons that the class will actually redeem." The
provisions also require courts to make written findings that
individual coupon settlements are fair before approving them.
12
In addition to the regulations aimed specifically at coupon
settlements, CAFA has a number of regulations intended to ensure
that class action settlements in general are fair. 13 For example, it
requires each defendant participating in a class action settlement to
notify various public officials about the settlement so that the
officials may intervene if the settlement is unfair. 14  In addition,
CAFA encourages closer examination of settlements that might
cause any class member to lose money, and it prohibits distributing
settlement funds based on class members' proximity to the court.
15
These provisions have raised a number of issues for litigants to
consider. The following hypothetical helps to illustrate a few of
them:
The Widget Shop, a small California corporation, sells
widgets nationwide over the Internet. A group of Widget
Shop customers in Arizona has brought a lawsuit against
the corporation and its sole shareholder, Donna Williams.
[hereinafter Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds]; Plaintiffs' Attorney Predicts
Defense Bar Will Reconsider Federal Class Action Reforms, 6 CLASS ACTION
LIT1G. REP. 676, 676 (2005).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006).
9. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
29.
10. O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 214 F.R.D. 266, 305 (E.D.
Pa. 2003).
11. § 1712(a); S. REP. NO. 109-14, at30.
12. § 1712(e).
13. See id; S. REP. NO. 109-14, at30.
14. § 1715(b); S. REP. No. 109-14, at32.
15. §§ 1713-1714.
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They claim that, although The Widget Shop displays type A
widgets on its website, it has been shipping type B widgets
to consumers who order them. They are seeking over $5
million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages on
behalf of all Widget Shop customers.
Williams asserts that there is no difference between
type A and type B widgets, and, after consulting her
attorney, believes that she would probably win if the case
went to trial. Unfortunately, The Widget Shop has been
struggling recently, and Williams is not sure the company
can afford to defend a class action suit. The Widget Shop
may also have to declare bankruptcy if it loses at trial. To
settle the case, The Widget Shop offers to stop displaying
type A widgets on its Website, pay class counsel's fees up
to $250,000, and give each class member a code they can
use to order a free type B widget from the company's
Website. Williams hopes that only a few class members
will actually claim a widget. In addition, Williams agrees
to settle any personal liability she may have for a small
nuisance value.
Peter Smith, counsel for the plaintiffs, believes that his
clients' claims are valid, but knows there is a substantial
likelihood they will lose at trial. The class representatives,
none of them having a large stake in the litigation, say that
they will do whatever Smith thinks is best. The rest of the
class is largely unaware of the litigation.
This hypothetical raises a number of questions related to the
Consumer Bill of Rights. For example, does The Widget Shop's
proposal constitute a "coupon" settlement under the Act? If so, how
will the court assess its fairness, and how will it calculate Smith's
fees? In addition, if Smith declines the settlement (believing his fees
would be too low or too uncertain), how will the parties resolve the
case considering that The Widget Shop is unlikely to be able to pay a
large monetary settlement?
The notification requirements raise additional issues. For
example, under CAFA, The Widget Shop will need to notify various
officials about the settlement. 16 Some of them may intervene. If
16. See § 1715.
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they do, they may help protect the class' interests, but they are also
likely to increase the parties' litigation costs. If The Widget Shop
notifies all of these officials, will Williams need to notify them about
her settlement in the class as well? Doing so may be a large burden
relative to the amount she has agreed to pay. Williams may want to
consider these issues before deciding to remove the action to federal
court.
Because CAFA became effective only a short time ago,1 7 courts
have not yet had a chance to clarify these issues through litigation.
Critics contend that they will give rise to a plethora of needless
litigation.18 In addition, many observers maintain that the Consumer
Class Action Bill of Rights will do little to further class members'
interests.' 9  Despite these preliminary uncertainties, proponents
nevertheless contend that the Bill of Rights will provide important
protections for plaintiffs and will help to ensure that class action
settlements are fair.20
This Article explores some of the issues surrounding CAFA.
Part B examines the provisions relating to coupon settlements. It
discusses the meaning of "coupon" under the Act and looks at the
way courts will calculate attorneys' fees under the new rules. It
includes a discussion of the new requirement that courts base fees on
the number of coupons redeemed rather than the number offered.
Finally, it looks at how courts will assess the fairness of class action
settlements.
Part C examines the notification provisions, explaining the
different requirements and the various issues associated with each of
them. Part D analyzes the provision calling for increased
examination of settlements in which class members lose money and
the provision prohibiting geographical discrimination against class
members. Finally, the article concludes that, while commentators are
likely to argue over both the merits of the Act and the meanings of its
provisions, only litigation and experience will determine how
17. CAFA became law on February 18, 2005. Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 4, 14.
18. Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds, supra note 7, at 177.
19. See John Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, Litigating in the New
Class Action World: A Guide to CAFA's Legislative History, 6 CLASS ACTION
LITIG. REP. 403, 412-13 (2005).
20. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 33-35 (2004), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 32-34.
October 2006] 1107
LOYOLA OF LOSANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 39:1103
beneficial, detrimental, or ineffective the Bill of Rights will be.
B. Coupon Settlement Provisions
CAFA contains several provisions relating to so-called "coupon
settlements.",2' Although CAFA does not define precisely what a
coupon settlement is, 22 legislators aimed these provisions at class
action settlements in which class members receive vouchers,
redeemable for discounts off future purchases, rather than cash.23
Many observers have criticized such settlements in recent years,
arguing that they often provide little or no benefit to class members
but reward class counsel with large fees.24
CAFA addresses these concerns in two principal ways. First, it
creates standards for calculating attorneys' fees in coupon
25settlements. More specifically, it requires courts to base fees in
such settlements on either the value of the coupons the class redeems
or the amount of work the attorneys have performed.26 Proponents
intended this requirement to prevent situations in which class action
attorneys collect large fees, but class members receive "essentially
valueless coupons" they do not want and will not use.27 By tying
contingency fees to coupon redemption, lawmakers hoped CAFA
would encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to avoid settlements involving
unwanted coupons and to negotiate settlements involving either cash
or coupons with actual value.28
The second principal way in which CAFA regulates coupon
settlements is by requiring courts to scrutinize any proposed
21. See § 1712.
22. See id.
23. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 30. For further discussion of the definition
of a coupon settlement, see infra Part V.B. 1.
24. E.g., Ameet Sachdev, Coupon Awards Reward Whom?, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 29, 2004, at C1. For an example of the types of settlements observers
have criticized, see Schneider v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 372
(E.D.N.Y. 2004). In Schneider, the plaintiffs in a class action suit against a
mortgage company received coupons for $100 off the closing costs of a new
mortgage from the defendant. Id. at 375. The coupons were nontransferable,
were not combinable with any other offers, and were good for only two years.
Id. at 376. Meanwhile, their attorneys received an award of $500,000 in fees.
Id. at 379.
25. § 1712(a) (c).
26. Id.
27. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 30.
28. See id.
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settlement in which the class will receive coupons, before the court
may approve it.29 Specifically, it requires courts to hold a hearing
and make a written finding that the settlement is "fair, reasonable,
and adequate" before it can approve any coupon settlement.
30
Proponents intended this provision to ensure that courts would
carefully examine proposed coupon settlements and thereby provide
further protection against unfair settlements.3' As critics have
pointed out, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 already
requires courts to determine whether a proposed settlement is "fair,
reasonable, and adequate" before approving any class action
settlement.
32
1. What Is a Coupon?
The coupon-settlement provisions in the Consumer Bill of
Rights 33 raise the question: what exactly is a coupon? Does the
definition of "coupon" include all vouchers or only those that are
good for discounts on future purchases? Does it include other
benefits that consumers may not need a voucher to receive? Because
the coupon-settlement provisions apply only to settlements in which
class members receive "coupons," 34 the answer to this question will
determine which settlements are subject to the settlement
provisions.
3 5
29. § 1712(e).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1008-09 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement
of Sen. Hatch) ("The bill provides that a Federal judge cannot approve a
proposed coupon settlement until conducting a hearing with a written finding
that the terms of the settlement are fair, reasonable, and equitable to the class
members. You would think that would be something every court in the land
would want to do, but, unfortunately, we have had far too many of these class
actions where that hasn't been the case .... Our courts will no longer be used
as a rubberstamp for proposed settlements. This provision ensures that the true
beneficiaries of a settlement are the class members and not the lawyers who
drew up the settlement.").
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C). For further discussion on this point, see
infra Part V.B.3.
33. § 1712.
34. Id.
35. The definition may also help class action attorneys determine what
benefits to offer in a settlement. For example, if the definition of "coupon"
included only vouchers redeemable for discounts, and the parties did not want
to be subject to the new settlement provisions, they could offer vouchers
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CAFA itself does not define the term "coupon. '36 The
definition presumably includes vouchers redeemable for discounts
off future purchases from the defendant. 37  Indeed, settlements
offering these types of certificates were the prime targets of the
legislation.
38
It is less clear, however, whether the term includes other types
of non-cash relief.39 For example, the term "coupon" could include
any form of relief that requires class members to take affirmative
action to receive the benefit.40 This would include certificates that
are directly redeemable for cash or that cover the full cost of a
replacement item.41 It might also include stocks and warrants.42
"Coupon" could also include other non-cash relief that would
provide similar benefits without the need for affirmative action.43
For example, a settlement could give cell phone users free minutes,44
it could give insurance customers additional coverage at no charge,
45
or it could give car owners an extended warranty.46 To expand the
definition even further, it might cover cases where the proposed
benefit is available to the public at large. For example, in Yong Soon
redeemable for cash instead.
36. § 1712.
37. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 15 20 (2004), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15 20 (citing numerous cases that include vouchers,
discounts, and coupons as within the provisions of coupon settlements); Mark
Herrmann & Pearson Bownas, The Likely Impact of the Class Action Fairness
Act, FOR THE DEFENSE, Apr. 2005, at 26, 31.
38. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 15 20.
39. A previous version of the bill applied to all settlements "under which
the class members would receive noncash benefits or would otherwise be
required to expend funds in order to obtain part or all of the proposed
benefits." Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. § 3(a)
(2003).
40. Herrmann & Bownas, supra note 37, at 31.
41. Id.
42. In re Lucent Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433 (D.N.J
2004).
43. Herrmann & Bownas, supra note 37, at 3 1.
44. In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., No. 4:03-md-0 1559,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23342, at *11 13 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 20, 2004).
45. Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 221 (D.N.J
2005).
46. O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 214 F.R.D. 266, 272 (E.D.
Pa. 2003).
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Oh v. AT&T Corp. ,47 a telephone company offered to provide a toll-
free telephone number for one weekend, from which callers could
obtain free directory assistance.
4 8
Finally, if a class action arose from the defendant's failure to
honor coupons, the parties could agree to settle the case with
injunctive relief that would require the defendant to honor the
coupons. The act does not explain whether such a settlement would
be a coupon settlement.49
The precise definition of the term "coupon" will not be clear
until the courts define it through litigation.50 If the courts define it
broadly, it may greatly increase the impact of the legislation by
increasing the number of cases to which it applies. 51 Conversely, a
narrow definition may give litigants the ability to avoid the
application of CAFA by offering non-cash items or services that do
not fit the definition of "coupon.,
52
2. Calculating Attorneys' Fees Under CAFA
Courts typically calculate attorneys' fees in class actions using
two principal methods. 53  The first is the percentage-of-recovery
method, in which the court grants counsel a fraction of the
settlement's overall value as fees. 54 The second is the lodestar-with-
multiplier method, in which the court calculates fees by multiplying
the number of hours the attorneys worked by a multiplier the court
chooses.55 When courts use one of these methods, they often use the
47. 225 F.R.D. 142, 144 (D.N.J. 2004).
48. Id.
49. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711 1712 (2006).
50. See David R. Koch, Clipping Coupons, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., July
2005, at 46, 49.
51. BTNGHAM MCCUTCHEN, THE 2005 CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT:
WHAT IT DOES, WHAT IT DOESN'T DO, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE
FUTURE 5 (2005), available at http://www.bingham.com/bingham/webadmin/
documents/radD413c.pdf ("[T]o the extent the provision extends to all non-
cash consideration (as opposed to just traditional 'coupons,' .... ), the
provision may have a drastic impact on class action settlement practice.").
52. Koch, supra note 50, at 49.
53. E.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 188 (3d Cir. 2005).
54. E.g., id.
55. Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 248 (D.N.J.
2005); see, e.g., Schneider v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 372,
379 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (using the lodestar-with-multiplier method); O'Keefe v.
Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 214 F.R.D. 266, 304 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (using the
October 2006] NEW RULES 1111
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other method as a crosscheck.56 If the lodestar method produces a
very different number than the percentage-of-recovery method, the
court may adjust the fees accordingly.57 Courts have used both of
these methods to calculate fees for coupon settlements, 58 and, under
CAFA, they will be able to continue to rely on them.
59
a. The percentage-of-recovery method
Under the percentage-of-recovery method, courts must first
"value the proposed settlement and then decide what percentage of
the settlement should be awarded as fees." 60  To do this in a
settlement that includes coupons, courts must first determine the
coupons' value. 6 1 Some courts rely on expert testimony to determine
each coupon's actual value to the user.62  Others simply value
coupons at theirface value.
63
percentage-of-recovery method and cross checking the result with the lodestar-
with-multiplier method).
56. E.g., Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 249; see, e.g., In re Lloyd's Am. Trust
Fund Litig., No. 96 Civ. 1262 (RWS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22663, at *78
(S.D.N.Y Nov. 26, 2002) (finding that the "requested fee award is also
reasonable based on a cross-check of the percentage award against counsel's
lodestar").
57. See, e.g., Varcallo, 226 F.R.D at 249.
58. See supra notes 54 57. Some courts choose the method they will use
according to the type of case. See, e.g., Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 248 49
(stating that the lodestar method is appropriate for "statutory fee shifting
cases," while the percentage-of-recovery method is appropriate for "common
fund cases.").
59. CAFA does not prevent courts from using either of the standard
methods for calculating fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (b) (2006). Thus, it is
likely that courts will continue to use these methods.
60. Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 249 (citing In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir. 1995)).
61. See In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 292
F. Supp. 2d 184, 190 (D. Me. 2003) (delaying the payment of attorneys' fees
because the judge was not confident in the redemption rate and, therefore,
could not determine the settlement's total value).
62. E.g., In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00 Civ. 0648 (LAK),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1713, at *22 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 22, 2001).
63. E.g., O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 214 F.R.D. 266, 305
(E.D. Pa. 2003). Thus, if a coupon entitles the bearer to ten dollars off a
product or service, the court would find that the coupon is worth ten dollars.
By contrast, if the court uses experts to determine the coupon's actual value, it
may find that the coupon is worth less than its face value. E.g., In re Auction
Houses, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1713, at *22. To use a simple example,
suppose a defendant generally gives its customers a ten-dollar discount on a
1112
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Regardless of which method a court uses to determine an
individual coupon's value, it must then multiply that value by the
total number of coupons to determine the settlement's overall
value.64 Before CAFA, some courts used the number of coupons
distributed in the settlement as the total number of coupons for this
calculation. 65  Others used the number of coupons that class
members were likely to redeem as the actual value.66 These latter
courts used expert witnesses to predict redemption rates.67 Some
courts even waited until after the class members had redeemed the
coupons before calculating their value, so they could base their
calculations on the actual number of coupons redeemed.68
Once the court has valued the settlement, it need only determine
what percentage of the value to award as fees. 69 The court has some
discretion over this percentage, and the percentage varies from case
to case.70  In determining the appropriate percentage, courts may
consider a variety of factors, such as:
(1) the size of the fund and the number of persons
particular item. A coupon for twenty dollars off that item would be worth only
ten dollars if the bearer could not use it in conjunction with the existing
discount.
64. See O'Keefe, 214 F.R.D. at 305.
65. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Britt, 174 F.R.D. 356, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
CAFA prohibits courts from doing this. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2006). It
requires courts to base fees on the value of redeemed coupons. Id. For further
discussion on this point, see infra Part V.B.2.c.
66. See, e.g., In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1018
(N.D. 111. 2000), aff'd, 267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Domestic Air
Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 322 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
67. See, e.g., In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
68. See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust
Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 320, 321 (D. Me. 2005); In re Excess Value Ins.
Coverage Litig., No. M-21-84 (RMB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14822, at *58
(S.D.N.Y July 30, 2004).
69. See, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 249
(D.N.J. 2005) ("[T]he court must 'determine a precise valuation of the
settlement on which to base its award."' (citing In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-
Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir. 1995))).
70. Id. at 249-50 (approving fees that amounted to 7.58% of the settlement,
but also noting that "the percentage of recovery.., generally ranges from
nineteen to forty-five percent"); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Attorneys Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 73 (2004) (finding that the mean percentage of
recovery varies from 17.6% for recoveries over $190 million to 30.9% for
recoveries under $1.4 million).
October 2006] 1113
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benefited; (2) the presence or absence of substantial
objections by class members to the fee amount; (3) the skill
and efficiency of counsel; (4) the complexity and duration
of the action; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of
time that counsel spent on the case; and (7) awards in
similar cases.71
b. The lodestar method
The second principal method courts use to calculate attorneys'
fees is the lodestar-with-multiplier method.72 Under this approach,
the court first multiplies the number of hours the attorney worked on
the case by a fair hourly rate.73 To determine an appropriate hourly
rate, the court may consider factors such as "the geographical area,
the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the
lawyer. '74 The result of this calculation is the "lodestar. 75
Once the court has determined the lodestar, it then multiplies it
by a court-chosen multiplier,76 generally a number in the low single
digits.77 In determining the appropriate multiplier, courts may
consider various factors, including risk and importance of the
litigation, counsel's performance, and the degree to which the
71. Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 250. The court also noted that, "'[c]ourts
typically decrease the percentage of the fee as the size of the fund increases.'
Id. at 249 (quoting In re Alloy, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1597 (WHP),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24129, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2004)); see also Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 121 (2d Cir. 2005)
(explaining that courts should consider: "(1) the time and labor expended by
counsel; (2) the magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (3) the risk of the
litigation... ; (4) the quality of representation; (5) the requested fee in relation
to the settlement; and (6) public policy considerations").
72. E.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 188 (3d Cir. 2005).
73. Id.; Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir.
2000).
74. Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1; see also In re Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc.,
398 F.3d 778, 780 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming an award of attorneys' fees that
correlated hourly rates to the attorney's level of experience); Mathur v. Bd. of
Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 317 F.3d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming an award of
attorneys' fees that determined hourly rates according to the geographic
location of the firm).
75. Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1.
76. Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 256.
77. O'Keefe v. Mercedes Benz USA, L.L.C., 214 F.R.D. 266, 311 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (stating that "multipliers in the range of one to four" are common and
noting criticism of a multiplier in the seven to ten range).
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settlement benefits the class.
78
c. The coupon redemption requirement
Under CAFA, the methods courts use to calculate attorneys' fees
will remain substantially the same.79  Nevertheless, CAFA does
make some modifications to the courts' existing methods. For
example, CAFA requires that, in a coupon settlement, "the portion of
any attorney's fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the
award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of
the coupons that are redeemed."80 Although this allows courts to
continue to use the percentage-of-recovery method, they must now
base their calculations on the coupons the class redeems rather than
all of the coupons the defendant offers.8' Some courts already base
attorneys' fees on the number of coupons redeemed. 82 Many courts,
however, base fees on the number of coupons issued.83 Even critics
who have called other provisions in CAFA useless seem to agree that
this provision will affect the way courts calculate fees.
84
The provision's purpose is to prevent "inequities" in which class
members receive "essentially valueless coupons," while their
attorneys receive substantial cash fees.8 5 If the class members do not
value the coupons, they will not use them, and the attorneys' fees
78. See Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 254 55; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 121 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Courts ... may increase
the ... multiplier based on factors such as the riskiness of the litigation and the
quality of the attorneys."); Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 968 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining that the multiplier varies according to factors such as "the
risk involved and the length of the proceedings"); Wininger v. SI Mgmt. L.P.,
301 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that appropriate factors include
the nature of work, its level of difficulty, and the level of success).
79. The provisions of the act allow courts to use either of the principal
methods described above. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (c) (2006). In fact,
§ 1712(b) specifically states that CAFA does not prohibit the lodestar method.
Id.
80. § 1712 (a).
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
84. Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 370. The provision may also
change the practices of those courts that use experts to predict redemption
rates. See supra Part V.B.2.c.
85. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 30 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
29-30.
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will be lower. Thus, by tying attorneys' fees to the number of
coupons actually redeemed, CAFA helps to ensure that the attorneys'
interests are more closely aligned with the class'.
The coupon-redemption provision raises an issue about the
timing of the calculations: must courts delay calculating the fees until
after the class has redeemed the coupons? 86 This would be necessary
for courts to determine the actual number of coupons the class will
redeem.87  Another option would be to use expert testimony to
predict in advance the number of coupons the class will redeem.
88
CAFA does provide that a court may "receive expert testimony...
on the actual value to the class members of the coupons that are
redeemed." 89 It does not specify, however, whether such testimony
is limited to an analysis of the coupons' actual value (versus their
face value) or whether it may also include an analysis of likely
redemption rates.
90
The majority of CAFA's critics and supporters seem to adhere to
the interpretation that attorneys must wait until after the class has
redeemed the coupons to collect their fees.91 Indeed, although the
legislative history is not conclusive on this point, it does seem to
support that interpretation.
92
86. See Bingham McCutchen, supra note 52, at 5 ("CAFA affirms the
existing practice of utilizing expert testimony on the value of coupon
settlements-which includes an analysis of the benefit to plaintiffs who
redeem the coupons as well as the likelihood of redemption .... But judicial
consideration of the likelihood of redemption is not the same as a statutory
provision pegging fees to actual redemption rates ....").
87. MCCUTCHEN, supra note 51, at 5 ("[P]laintiffs' attorneys may need to
wait until after the redemption period to submit their fee petitions.").
88. Webeast: The Class Action Fairness Act: Tort Reform or a Detour?, FD
WIRE, June 23, 2005, http://www.acca.com (follow "webcasts" hyperlink;
follow "archived webcasts" hyperlink; then follow "Trial: .. ." hyperlink)
[hereinafter Webcast] ("[T]he court is now allowed to hear expert testimony on
the actual value of redeemed coupons so there is going to be, potentially, a
battle of experts going in who will say, you know, I estimate 22% of these
coupons will be redeemed, or I estimate 10% of these coupons will be
redeemed." (statement of Bruce Copeland, Partner, Nixon Peabody)).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(d) (2006).
90. See MCCUTCHEN, supra note 51, at 5.
91. See, e.g., Rob Gaudet, Tying Lawyers' Fees to Final Coupon
Redemption Takes Class Action Bill from "Stupid" to "Stupider," 5 CLASS
ACTION LITIG. REP. 103, 103 (2004); Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds, supra
note 7, at 177, 178; Herrmann & Bownas, supra note 37, at 31.
92. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 30 (2004), as reprinted in 2005
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d Other attorneys'fees provisions
Although the coupon redemption requirement is the main thrust
of CAFA's regulation of attorneys' fees, CAFA has other provisions
regulating this area.93 CAFA specifically provides that, if a court
does not calculate fees based on the number of coupons redeemed, it
must calculate them based on the reasonable number of hours the
attorneys spent on the case. 94 This essentially gives courts the option
to use the lodestar-with-multiplier method instead of the percentage-
of-recovery method. 95 Because most courts already had the option to
use this method, 96 this subsection is unlikely to significantly affect
the calculation of attorneys' fees. 97 However, since the subsection
specifically states that it does not prohibit the lodestar method, it may
encourage courts to use that method more often. In the past, courts
often used the lodestar method in coupon-settlement cases only as a
crosscheck for the percentage-of-recovery method. 98
CAFA also contains provisions relating to mixed settlements,
those with both coupons and equitable relief.99 These provisions
reiterate that, in such settlements, courts must base any fees
attributable to coupons on the value of the coupons redeemed. 100
The provisions also state that the court may base any fees not
calculated in this way on the amount of time the attorneys spent on
the case. 101 Finally, the provisions specify that the calculation should
also include a fee for obtaining the equitable relief, if applicable.
10 2
Again, these provisions seem unlikely to significantly affect the
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30 (stating that fees will be based on the "coupons actually
redeemed" (emphasis added)).
93. See § 1712.
94. See § 1712(b).
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
97. CAFA also requires that a court approve any fee under this subsection.
§ 1712(b)(2). Nevertheless, because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
already requires courts to approve all class action settlements, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(1)(A), the provision requiring approval of any fee is also unlikely to have
any real affect on the calculation of attorneys' fees.
98. See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust
Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322 (D. Me. 2005); O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, L.L.C., 214 F.R.D. 266, 304 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
99. § 1712(c).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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calculation of attorneys' fees. Rather, they appear to simply clarify
the procedure for calculating fees when a coupon settlement also
provides equitable relief. CAFA fails, however, to set forth a
separate procedure for calculating fees when a coupon settlement
includes both equitable relief and cash. 0 3 Thus, such a settlement
would seem to fall under the same provisions as mixed settlements.
If courts interpret CAFA this way, the mixed-settlement provisions
would seem to require that courts calculate attorneys' fees for the
cash portion of the settlement using the lodestar method, given that
such fees would not be "based upon ... the recovery of the
coupons. ' 04  Because courts usually calculate fees for cash
settlements using the percentage-of-recovery method, this new
method would be a "substantial departure from current practice."'
0 5
e. The ramifications of coupon settlements
Although many of the provisions discussed above are unlikely to
significantly affect the calculation of attorneys' fees,10 6 the
redemption requirement is likely to do so. 10 7 Class attorneys will
have a financial incentive to ensure that any coupons included in a
settlement are valuable to the class.108 Otherwise, class members
will be less likely to redeem them, and attorneys' fees will be
lower. 10 9 Similarly, if attorneys cannot collect their fees until after
the class actually redeems the coupons, they will have an incentive to
ensure that class members are aware of the coupons and that they
understand the settlement.
The most significant affect the redemption requirement will
have, however, is to reduce the number of coupon settlements.
Although the redemption requirement does not ban coupon
103. Id.
104. GEORGENE M. VA1RO, CLASS ACT1ON FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: A
REVIEW AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 19 (2005).
105. Id.
106. See supra Part V.B.2.d.
107. See Stanton D. Anderson et al., McDermott, Will & Emery, Trial: What
the Class Action Fairness Act Means for Your Business, MONDAQ BUS.
BRIEFING, Mar. 1, 2005, http://www.mandaq.com/article.asp?articleid 31209/
searchresults 1&print 1.
108. Webeast, supra note 88 (statement of Joe Catalano, Senior Vice
President and Chief Litigation Counsel, Union Bank of California).
109. Id.
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settlements, 110 it strongly discourages them.111  Indeed, some
observers predict that it may virtually eliminate such settlements
altogether.
112
One reason for this prediction is that the redemption requirement
will reduce class counsel's main incentive to enter into such a
settlement: large attorneys' fees. 113  Traditionally, defendants
favored coupon settlements, because such settlements did not require
large cash payments, and the class was unlikely to redeem all of the
coupons. 114 Meanwhile, plaintiffs' attorneys were willing to agree to
such settlements, because they typically had higher face values than
cash settlements.' 5 Because courts generally calculated fees using
the value of the coupons offered, rather than the value of the coupons
redeemed, coupon settlements consequently came with larger
attorneys' fees. 
1 6
CAFA has eliminated this larger fee incentive. 117 Courts will
base the fees on redemption rates rather than the face value of the
coupons.' Consequently, redemption rates are generally low,1 19
and fees in coupon settlements will be much lower under this method
of calculation.
Another reason the redemption requirement will discourage
coupon settlements is that it will increase the difficulty and
uncertainty of calculating attorneys' fees.1 20 Attorneys will need to
110. 28 U.S.C § 1712(a) (2006).
111. Anderson et al., supra note 107.
112. See id; Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds, supra note 7, at 178.
113. See Anderson et al., supra note 107.
114. Id.; Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 370.
115. See Anderson et al., supra note 107 (stating that "[s]ettling parties
sought approval of coupon settlements by highlighting the total value offered
to class members").
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2006).
119. MCCUTCHEN, supra note 51, at 5 ("[S]ome recent studies indicate that
only about 25% of coupons offered in any class action are ever redeemed, with
the redemption rate falling to only 13% in cases involving consumer plaintiffs.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that even these low redemption rates are
decreasing over time."); see also In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised
Price Antitrust Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 320, 321 (D. Me. 2005) (stating that
only two percent of the coupons offered in a settlement were actually
redeemed).
120. See Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds, supra note 7, at 178.
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consult experts to determine likely redemption rates before they will
be able to estimate their expected fees. Moreover, if courts defer
calculating fees until after the class has redeemed the coupons, they
may not be able to determine or collect their fees until long after the
settlement. 121 Thus, the redemption requirement increases the risks
associated with the settlement for class counsel.
In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust
Litigation122 illustrates these problems. In that case, the defendant
sent the class 8.1 million coupons, which the court valued at $4.28
each. 123  Before CAFA, many courts would have evaluated the
settlement, for the purposes of calculating attorneys' fees, by
multiplying the number of coupons offered by the value of each
coupon, and would have arrived at a value of nearly $34.7 million.
Under CAFA, however, courts will evaluate the settlement using
predicted or actual redemption rates. 124 In In re Compact Disc,
experts predicted redemption rates of between 15 and 20%. 125 Using
these rates, the settlement would be worth between $5.2 and $6.9
million. The court, however, deferred calculating the attorneys' fees
until the class had actually redeemed the coupons. 126 When it finally
did calculate fees, it found that only 2% of the class members had
actually redeemed coupons. 127 Thus, the court determined that the
settlement was worth only $1.5 million. 128 Applying the percentage
of recovery method, the court awarded the attorneys $451,100 in
fees, 30% of the value of the settlement.' 29 This covered only 30%
of their litigation costs, however.' 30 While the court's calculation of
fees in this case was consistent with the interpretation of CAFA's
redemption requirement that most observers seem to support, 131 it
resulted in fees that were much lower and less predictable than they
would have been under the percentage-of-coupons-offered method
121. Id.
122. 370 F. Supp. 2d 320.
123. Id. at 321.
124. See 28 U.S.C § 1712(a) (2006).
125. In re Compact Disc, 292 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (D. Me. 2003).
126. Id. at 190.
127. In re Compact Disc, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 322.
130. Id. at 323.
131. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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many courts used before CAFA.
f Settling weak claims
Proponents of the coupon-settlement provisions will likely be
pleased if CAFA eliminates most coupon settlements. There will
probably be far fewer coupon settlements, and the few that remain
will be more likely to provide real value to the class. Some analysts
nevertheless argue that this virtual elimination of coupon settlements
may have some unintended and negative effects.
132
For example, some observers predict it will eliminate an
important tool for avoiding litigation and resolving weak class action
claims. 133  Because class actions often involve large sums of
money,1 34 defendants are often disinclined to litigate even weak
claims. 35 Even when the likelihood that the defendant will lose is
low, the costs of litigation and the potential adverse judgment could
be quite high. 136  For some corporate defendants, losing a class
action could mean bankruptcy.' 37 Indeed, for defendants who cannot
raise enough cash to pay for a large cash settlement, non-cash
settlements such as coupons are the only viable way to settle the
case.
138
Coupon settlements allow defendants to settle cases they believe
to be weak without resorting to litigation 3 9 and without putting up a
large amount of cash.1 40 Under CAFA, however, class counsel will
be far less likely to negotiate coupon settlements. 14 1 As a result,
defendants may no longer have the option to use coupons to settle
132. E.g., Aashish Y. Desai, The Class Action Fairness Act, ORANGE
COUNTY LAW., July 2005, at 20, 23. For an in-depth discussion of the
unintended consequences of the Class Action Fairness Act, see supra Part V.
133. Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds, supra note 7, at 178.
134. According to one study of class action cases between 1993 and 2002,
the mean gross recovery in the 370 cases studied was $100 million. Eisenberg
& Miller, supra note 70, at 74.
135. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 20 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
21.
136. Id. at 21.
137. Id.
138. See Desai, supra note 132, at 22.
139. Lindeman, Class Action Bar Girds, supra note 7, at 178.
140. Anderson et al., supra note 107.
141. Id.
October 2006] 1121
LOYOLA OF LOSANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 39:1103
claims they believe to be weak. 142 This may have two effects. It
may discourage some plaintiffs' attorneys from bringing weak cases,
because they know defendants will be unable or unwilling to offer
settlements that would bring them large fees. Conversely, however,
it may force defendants who do find themselves subjected to lawsuits
they believe to be unmeritorious to make a tough decision: overpay
for a weak claim or go to trial despite the associated risks and costs.
3. Obtaining Court Approval
In addition to regulating attorneys' fees, CAFA regulates how
courts review and approve coupon settlements. 43 Before Congress
passed CAFA, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) governed court
approval of class actions. 144  Under CAFA, the procedure for
obtaining court approval will essentially remain the same. 145
a. Rule 23(e)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires the court to
approve all class action settlements. 146 Before the court may do this,
however, it must first hold a hearing and find that the settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate.147 To determine whether a settlement
meets these criteria, courts consider several factors, such as: "(1)
comparison of the proposed settlement with the likely result of
litigation; (2) reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) stage of the
litigation and the amount of discovery completed; (4) quality of
counsel; (5) conduct of the negotiations; and (6) prospects of the
case, including risk, complexity, expense and duration."'148  In
addition, if the defendant and class counsel reached the settlement
142. Id.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2006).
144. See FED. R. CtV. P. 23(e).
145. See infra Parts V.B.3.
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A).
147. Id. at 23(e)(1)(C).
148. In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216
F.R.D. 197, 206 (D. Me. 2003) (citing Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953
(9th Cir. 2003); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[A]ppellate courts consider some or all of
[these] ... factors .... "); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1014 (10th Cir.
1993); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir.
1992); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 465, 468-70 (2d Cir.
1974)).
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after "sufficient discovery and genuine arm's-length negotiation,"
many courts will presume that it is fair.
149
b. Changes under CAFA
Under CAFA, courts may only approve coupon settlements after
holding a hearing and making a written finding that the settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate.1 50 Thus, the procedure for obtaining
court approval under the new act is quite similar to the procedure for
obtaining court approval under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.15' The only way in which CAFA differs from the rule is
by requiring that the court write out its findings.'
52
By requiring courts to put their findings into writing and by
reaffirming their responsibility to scrutinize settlements, CAFA may
encourage courts to be more thorough when inspecting proposed
settlements. 153 Beyond this, however, the provision is unlikely to
significantly affect the way courts approve coupon settlements.
c. Donations to charity
CAFA specifically authorizes courts to distribute any coupons
the class has not claimed to charity or government organizations.
54
It also specifies, however, that the court may not consider the
redemption of those coupons when it calculates attorneys' fees.' 
55
Even before CAFA, settlements sometimes included
distributions to charity or government entities. 156  Parties often
149. Id., 216 F.R.D. at 207 (citing City P'ship Co. v. Atl. Acquisition Ltd.
P'ship, 100 F.3d 1041, 1043 (1st Cir. 1996); New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd.,
903 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 96 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996)).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2006).
151. Compare FED. R. CTV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) ("The court may approve a
settlement... only after a hearing and on finding that the settlement... is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.") with § 1712(e) ("[T]he court may approve the
proposed settlement only after a hearing to determine whether, and making a
written finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate .....
152. § 1712(e).
153. Koch, supra note 50, at 48.
154. § 1712(e).
155. Id.
156. E.g., In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir.
2001) (distributing "$4.6 million to organizations that assist the Mexican-
American community"); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price
Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197, 208-09 (D. Me. 2003) (distributing CD's to
states for further distribution to schools and libraries); In re Motorsports
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negotiated settlements that included such distributions when it was
not possible to locate a large portion of the class,1 57 or when there
were excess settlement funds. 158 Courts additionally had the power
to distribute the portions of the settlement the class members did not
claim.
1 59
CAFA merely reaffirms the courts' power to make such
distributions in the context of coupon settlements. 6 Thus, while
this provision may encourage courts to make charitable donations of
unclaimed coupons by specifically authorizing them to do so, it does
not expand the power courts already have.' 61 The only significant
change this provision makes is to prohibit basing attorneys' fees on
charitable distributions.
162
C. Notification Requirements
Class representatives seldom have a substantial stake in class
action litigation. 163 They are therefore unlikely to closely monitor
the attorneys representing them.'1 64 Some observers contend that this
"clientless litigation" has led to abuses. 165  They maintain that,
without significant client input and oversight, some attorneys may
not be able to fully represent the class' interests; some may even
enter into collusive settlements. 
166
Merchandise Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1399 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(distributing excess settlement funds to ten different charities).
157. In re Mex. Money Transfer, 267 F.3d at 746; In re Compact Disc, 216
F.R.D. at 208.
158. In re Motorsports Merchandise, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395.
159. Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 362 F. Supp. 2d 574,
576 (E.D. Pa. 2005); In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d
679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002).
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2006); Schwartz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
161. See In re Airline Ticket Comm 'n, 307 F.3d at 682-83 (stating that courts
have applied cy pres principles in the context of class action lawsuits since
1997); § 1712(e).
162. § 1712(e). Before the Act, some courts did base fees on charitable
distributions. See, e.g., In re Compact Disc, 216 F.R.D at 208, 216-17 (basing
attorneys' fees, in part, on the distribution of $75.7 million in CD's to libraries
and schools).
163. Beisner & Miller, supra note 3, at 105.
164. Id.
165. E.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 33 (2004), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 32; Fiereck, supra note 1, at 333-34.
166. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 33; Beisner & Miller, supra note 3, at
105; Fiereck, supra note 1, at 333-34.
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CAFA responds to these concerns by requiring defendants in
class actions to notify certain officials about pending settlements.,
67
This allows government officials the opportunity to intervene if they
believe a settlement is unfair.' 68  Proponents intended these
provisions to provide additional oversight for class action
litigation. 16  Many observers, however, have criticized the
provisions, claiming they will waste time and increase litigation costs
with no assurance they will provide any real benefits.' 
70
1. Timing
CAFA requires each defendant participating in a settlement to
notify the "appropriate" state and federal officials about pending
settlements. 171 Defendants must serve these notifications within ten
days after filing a proposed settlement with the court.' 72 Because
this does not give defendants much time to deliver the notifications,
defendants may wish to identify the appropriate officials and prepare
the notification papers before filing the settlement.'
1 73
The court may not approve the settlement until ninety days after
the parties have filed it. 174 This gives the appropriate officials time
to review the notification documents and to intervene if they choose
to do so. 175 There is, however, no requirement that the officials do
anything with the information they receive. 176 This has prompted
some observers to speculate that, despite the burdens the notification
provisions will impose on defendants, the provisions may not elicit
the additional oversight lawmakers intended.
177
167. § 1715(b); S. REP. No. 109-14, at 32.
168. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 32.
169. See id. at 34.
170. See, e.g., Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 371 ("Whether the huge
volume of paperwork that these provisions entail will benefit anyone is not
entirely clear. Perhaps the authors of the Act took the view that the U.S.
Attorney General does not receive enough junk mail.").
171. § 1712(b). For a discussion of the meaning of "appropriate," see infra
Part V.C.3.
172. § 1715(b).
173. Fiereck, supra note 1, at 335.
174. § 1715(d).
175. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 33 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
32.
176. § 1715(f).
177. See Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 371.
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2. The Contents of the Notifications
CAFA specifies that defendants should send certain materials to
each official they notify 178 The notifications should include:
* a copy of the complaint, any materials filed with it, and
any amended complaints;
" notice of any scheduled hearings;
* the proposed settlement;
* any other concurrent agreements between the defendants
and class counsel;
" any notifications directed at class members regarding the
proposed settlement or their right to request exclusion
from the class;
" any final judgment in the case or notice of dismissal;
* any written judicial opinion about:
o the class notifications;
o the proposed settlement;
o any other concurrent agreements between the
defendant and class counsel; or
" any final judgment or notice of dismissal; and
* for notifications to state officials:
o a list of the class members who reside in the
official's state and their proportionate shares of
the settlement; or
o if it is not feasible to make such a list, a
reasonable estimate of the people in the state and
their proportionate shares of the settlement.
179
Some observers contend that the last requirement will be the
most burdensome. 180 It requires defendants, when "feasible," to
compile a list of the class members in each state and their
proportionate shares of the settlement. 81 It is doubtful, however,
that defendants will have updated addresses for all of the class
members. 182 Indeed, it is likely that many class members will have
178. § 1715(b).
179. Id.
180. E.g., Lindeman, Class Action Lawyers Doubt Provisions, supra note 7,
at 265; Plaintifs' Attorney Predicts Defense Bar Will Reconsider Federal
Class Action Reforms, supra note 7, at 676.
181. § 1715(b)(7)(A)-(B).
182. See Fiereck, supra note 1, at 335 ("Defense counsel will need to decide
1126
moved during the litigation. 83  In a large class, it may be quite
burdensome to identify and verify where each class member lives.
Defendants may instead wish to establish that it is not feasible to
do so. This, however, presents additional problems. CAFA does not
specify what a party must do to show infeasibility.' 84 Indeed, it does
not even specify which party would carry the burden of proof with
respect to this issue. 85 According to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary's report on CAFA, class counsel should carry the burden of
proving infeasibility. 186 Though some have questioned whether this
was a mistake,' 8 7 defendants will need to rely on class counsel to
establish infeasibility if courts adhere to this suggestion.
Furthermore, even if a defendant does establish that it is not
feasible to provide a list of class members, the defendant will still
need to estimate the number of class members in each state and the
proportion of the settlement each state's residents will receive.
188
This will become more complicated if the state officials disagree
with the amounts their respective states would receive under the
settlement. 189 If the officials choose to intervene, the parties will
face further litigation, which will delay the settlement and increase
costs.
Some critics contend that these notifications will be overly
burdensome in light of the benefits they are likely to render.,
90
Under CAFA, defense counsel must determine the appropriate
officials to notify, compile the necessary information, make state-by-
state calculations of plaintiffs' recoveries, and prepare numerous
if it will be satisfactory to rely on potentially outdated address data.").
183. According to a U.S. Census study, an average of 15.5% of the
population moved each year between 1993 and 2003. See JASON P.
SCHACHTER, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2002 TO 2003, at 2 (2004), available
at http:iiwww.census.gov/prod!2004pubsip20-549.pdf. During that time
period, an average of 2.7% of the population moved to another state each year.
Id. Thus, if a case takes years to settle, a significant portion of the class will
have moved to different states.
184. See § 1715(b)(7)(B).
185. Id.
186. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 34 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
33.
187. Fiereck, supra note 1, at 335.
188. § 1715(b)(7)(B).
189. Plaintiffs' Attorney Predicts Defense Bar Will Reconsider Federal
Class Action Reforms, supra note 7, at 676.
190. Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 371.
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reports. 19 Opponents grumble that this will increase defendants'
litigation costs. 92 Some also fear that the notifications will become
more difficult in the future if individual states and agencies adopt
additional regulations for submitting the notifications.'
93
3. Determining Whom to Notify
According to CAFA, defendants must notify the "appropriate"
officials about pending settlements.' 94 These officials consist of one
federal official and one official from "each State in which a class
member resides."' 195 The appropriate federal official is generally the
Attorney General of the United States.' 96  Meanwhile, the
appropriate official for a given state is the person "who has the
primary regulatory or supervisory responsibility with respect to the
defendant, or who licenses or otherwise authorizes the defendant to
conduct business in the State .... 197 If, however, there is no
official with such authority, or if the person with such authority does
not regulate the matters at issue, "then the appropriate official [is] the
State attorney general." 198
Some observers warn that determining which state officials to
notify may be problematic. 99 Because defendants are unlikely to
have updated addresses for class members,z20 it may be difficult to
identify each of the states "in which a class member resides." 2 1 This
may leave defendants unsure about which states' officials to
notify z. z Yet, if they fail to notify the proper officials, they risk
undermining the settlement.203 To avoid this prospect, defendants in
191. See § 1715.
192. E.g., Desai, supra note 132, at 23; Lynda Grant, CAFA: Is the Remedy
Worse than the Disease?, CLASS ACTION & DERIVATIVE SUITS, Spring 2005,
at 7, 11 ("Even an individual settling defendant will be required to send [these]
notices .... In a nationwide class, this could impose a staggering burden on
an individual defendant.").
193. Fiereck, supra note 1, at 335.
194. § 1715.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Fiereck, supra note 1, at 335.
200. See supra note 182 83 and accompanying text.
201. See § 1715(b); Fiereck, supra note 1, at 335.
202. See § 1715(e).
203. If a defendant fails to fulfill the notification requirements, class
1128
204
large class actions may choose to notify officials in every state.
Once a defendant has determined which states to notify, it must
determine which official in each of those states is the "appropriate"
official.20 5 If a defendant notifies the wrong officials, class members
may be able to avoid the settlement, thus exposing the defendant to
further litigation.2 06 In cases where the appropriate official is not
obvious, defendants therefore may wish to submit a list of officials to
the court for approval before filing the settlement with the court and
serving the notifications.
20 7
4. Depository Institutions
State and federal depository institutions, depository institution
holding companies, foreign banks, and the subsidiaries of these
institutions have slightly different notification requirements. 20 ' For
these defendants, the "appropriate" federal official is generally the
person with primary regulatory authority over the defendant. 209 If,
however, that official does not supervise or regulate the matters in
the allegations, then the Attorney General of the United States is the
appropriate federal official.2 10
In addition, jederal depository institutions may satisfy the
notification requirements simply by notifying the federal official
with primary regulatory authority over them (unless that official does
not supervise or regulate the matters in the allegations). 2 1 Thus, a
federal depository institution would not have to notify any state
officials.
212
Moreover, if the defendant is a state depository institution, it
may satisfy the notification requirements by notifying the appropriate
federal official and the bank supervisor of the state in which it is
incorporated or chartered (unless the state bank supervisor does not
members may be able to avoid the settlement. See infra Part V.C.5.
204. Fiereck, supra note 1, at 335.
205. § 1715(a)(2).
206. Id.; see infra Part V.C.5.
207. See Herrmann & Pearson, supra note 37, at 66.
208. § 1715.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id.
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regulate or supervise the matters in the allegations).213 Thus, a state
depository institution would only need to notify two officials.214
5. The Consequences of Failing
to Meet the Notification Requirements
If a defendant fails to meet the notification requirements, class
members may choose to avoid the settlement. 2 15 Any class member
seeking to do so, however, will have the burden of proving
noncompliance.21 6  Still, a class member may not seek exemption
from a settlement if the defendant provided notice to the appropriate
federal official and either the state attorney general or the official
with primary regulatory authority over the defendant.21 7
Class members' ability to avoid a settlement in certain
circumstances may make some defendants nervous about entering
into a class action settlement. 2 8 Such settlements generally protect
defendants from future litigation by preventing all class members
who do not opt out of the class from bringing the same suit against
the defendant in the future. 21 9 Under CAFA, however, if a defendant
fails to fulfill the notification requirements, there may then be risk
for further litigation over the same matters.220
6. Privacy Considerations
Some observers warn that the provisions may threaten the
privacy of certain settlements and other agreements. 22 1 For example,
CAFA requires defendants to notify government officials about any
agreements between the defendants and class counsel made
contemporaneously with the settlement.222 There is no requirement,
however, that these officials keep the agreements confidential.223
CAFA also requires defendants to notify regulatory authorities
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Fiereck, supra note 1, at 334.
219. Id.
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715(e) (2006).
221. E.g., Desai, supra note 132, at 23.
222. § 1715(b)(5).
223. See id.
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about class action settlements. Some observers note that when a
defendant notifies these authorities, the authorities may conduct their
own investigations into the underlying matters or into the
defendant's industry in general.225 This may have the unintended
effect of discouraging settlements, because it reduces the incentive to
settle and thereby avoid the publicity of trial. Proponents of the
notification provisions may argue, however, that this benefits the
public by alerting regulatory authorities about potential violations.
D. Other Provisions
The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights contains two other
provisions aimed at protecting class members.226  Critics have
nonetheless questioned whether either of these provisions will
actually benefit class members.227
1. Protection Against Loss by Class Members
Lawmakers aimed the first of these provisions at settlements in
which a class member would have to pay class counsel money, such
that the class member would actually lose money in the litigation.
22 8
Under CAFA, a court must make "a written finding that non-
monetary benefits to the class member substantially outweigh the
monetary loss" before approving any such settlement.
229
Lawmakers included this provision in the Act in response to a
particular case: Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp.. 230 In that case,
many of the class members paid more in attorneys' fees than they
collected from the suit.231 Dexter Kamilewicz, for example, paid
$91.33 in attorneys' fees but collected only $2.19 from the
224. § 1715(c)(1).
225. Desai, supra note 132, at 23 ("For example, if the Department of
Insurance learns about one insurance company's settlement for paying
independent brokers for selling 'vanishing premium' life insurance polices to a
certain segment of the population, it may begin its own investigation into the
policies of the life insurance industry in general. . .
226. §§ 1713-1714.
227. E.g., Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 371 ("These provisions are,
to put it mildly, inconsequential.").
228. § 1713.
229. Id.
230. 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996); see S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14, 32 (2004),
as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15, 31.
23 1. Kamilewicz, 192 F.3d at 508.
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settlement.232 By the time these class members realized that they had
to pay more in attorney's fees than they would collect, it was too late
to opt out of the class.
233
Critics counter, however, that these types of cases are very
unusual.234  Thus, the provision may be unlikely to affect many
lawsuits.2 35 Moreover, even if it does apply to a particular case, it
will not provide much more protection than Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 provided before CAFA.236 It is unlikely that a court
would find that a settlement was "fair, reasonable, and adequate," as
required by Rule 23,237 and, at the same time, that the benefits to the
class did not outweigh the monetary loss. 238 Some fear that, by
expressly authorizing such suits, the provision may even encourage
them.239
2. Protection Against Geographical Discrimination
Another provision in CAFA prohibits courts from approving a
proposed settlement that would pay some class members more than it
would pay others solely on the basis that those class members live
closer to the court. 2 4 0 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
stressed that this provision would only apply to cases in which
proximity to the courthouse was the only basis for the increased
payments. 24 1 Thus, if a case involved injuries resulting from a
chemical spill, and some class members sustained more injuries
because they lived closer to the site of the accident, the court could
approve a settlement that awarded more money to the plaintiffs who
232. Id.
233. See id. Indeed, the defendant in the underlying case, Bank of Boston,
objected to notifying the class, because it had failed to advise the class
members that they might pay more in attorneys' fees than they would collect.
Id. Nevertheless, the court approved the notifications. Id.
234. Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 371.
235. Id.
236. Id. ("Settlements that put class members out-of-pocket to pay class
counsel ... under Rule 23 would likely be approved by a court as fair only if
the class received significant nonmonetary benefits even without this new
statute.").
237. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C).
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1713 (2006).
239. Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 371.
240. § 1714.
241. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 32 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
31.
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lived closer to the site.24 2 As critics point out, however, it is difficult
to imagine a case in which a court would approve a settlement under
Rule 23 as "fair, reasonable, and adequate" 243 if proximity to the
courthouse were the sole basis for distributing the settlement
funds.244
E. Conclusion
The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights, like many of
CAFA's sections of the Class Action Fairness Act, has given rise to a
multitude of questions. Because CAFA is so young, few, if any, of
these questions yet have answers. Both CAFA's critics and
proponents are likely to continue debating the possibilities until a
court, Congress, or experience decides the issues. Even then it is
likely that new questions and debates will arise.
242. Id.
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C).
244. Nelson & Wolfman, supra note 1, at 371 ("[A] settlement that accorded
benefits solely on that basis could not conceivably pass muster under Rule
23.").
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